Jean Khoury

Summary: Every major technical revolution first relieves a burden and then puts a question to the person relieved: what is this freedom for? This article traces that question from writing, animal power and the mill, through printing, steam, electricity, computing and the network, to artificial intelligence. It argues that each liberation demanded a new interior effort of the human person, and that these efforts, accumulated over centuries, constitute a second history alongside the history of instruments: the discovery of conscience, of the subject, of the psyche and of the person. That second history is ambiguous. Left to itself it produces counterfeits: individualism, psychological self-management, and ideologies that harvest the human thirst for self-gift and spend it on causes. The article examines how philosophy, psychology, personalism and exegesis have each purified the Christian understanding of the person by stripping away its surrogates, and why the committed idealist who dies for a cause must be distinguished from the martyr who dies for a Person. It sets out what philosophy can establish about the irreducibility of personal acts, and what only theology can say about vocation, name, communion and grace. Artificial intelligence, which now performs tasks we had mistaken for our essence, completes the stripping. What remains is the specifically human, and in Christian terms the specifically Christian: to be called by name and to answer in love. The article closes with practical commitments for persons, educators, professionals and communities.

Introduction: The Question Behind the Machine

The more machines are capable of producing, the more we are invited to rediscover what distinguishes us from them. This sentence is more than a consolation offered to the anxious. It states a law that governs the whole history of human instruments. When an instrument takes over a burden, it exposes a question that the burden had concealed. So long as the entire strength of a person went into securing bread, warmth and shelter, the question of what a person is for could be postponed indefinitely. The machine does not answer that question. It removes the excuse for not asking it.

Two histories run side by side in this article. The first is the history of instruments: the extension of the hand, the voice, the memory and now the reasoning mind into things made. The second is the history of the self: the slow, uneven and often painful discovery that a human being is not merely a member of a species, a function in a city or a link in a lineage, but someone who answers for his or her own acts, bears a conscience, carries a hidden depth and is addressed by name. These histories are not identical, and neither causes the other. Technical liberation has often been captured by the strong, and interior discovery has often been made in poverty and in prison. Yet they converge at certain moments, and the convergence is instructive. Each time a burden was lifted, a new effort of interiorisation was required of us; each effort deepened our understanding of what we are; and each deepening, when separated from the truth about the origin and end of the person, produced a counterfeit of itself.

The thesis can be stated plainly. Technical power does not make us more human. It makes the question of our humanity unavoidable. The answers that the modern age has given, through individualism, psychology, philosophy and ideology, have each contributed something indispensable and each fallen short. The Christian answer, that the person is created, called by name and fulfilled in the gift of self, is not one more entry in that series. It is what the series has been searching for, and the series has, by its own failures, helped to make that answer intelligible. Artificial intelligence sharpens the matter beyond anything previously experienced, because for the first time the instrument performs operations that we had taken for the signature of our humanity: speaking, writing, summarising, composing, calculating, advising.

The argument moves at three levels, which must be kept distinct. At the historical level, it relies on documented developments. At the philosophical level, it offers interpretations that argue for a conclusion and do not simply report facts. At the theological level, it confesses a faith. To say that inventions enlarged human possibilities is a claim of history. To say that these possibilities summon us to a fuller realisation of our humanity is an anthropological claim. To say that the fullness of that realisation is found in Christ is a claim of faith. Nothing here supposes an automatic progress. A liberation can be wasted, perverted or confiscated. What the history shows is an invitation, never a guarantee.

Part I: The Law of Liberation

Aristotle imagined instruments that would work at the word of command, so that master craftsmen would have no need of assistants and masters no need of slaves.[1] The passage belongs to a defence of slavery that must be rejected without qualification. Yet it identifies a possibility with a long future: that a change in the means of production could dissolve an arrangement that had been treated as a law of nature. The lesson is double. A technical change can loosen what seemed necessary. And such a loosening raises a question that no instrument can settle, namely what the liberated are to do.

Hannah Arendt saw the difficulty with unusual clarity. Modern society, she observed, has glorified labour while making it superfluous, and so faces the prospect of a society of labourers without labour, a society that has forgotten the higher activities for whose sake the liberation from labour would be worth having.[2] Keynes, writing in 1930, predicted that the economic problem would in time be solved and that humanity would then meet its permanent problem: how to use its freedom from pressing economic cares.[3] Josef Pieper argued that the Western world had forgotten leisure, understood not as idleness or recuperation for further work but as a receptive, contemplative attitude, the condition of culture and worship.[4] The Rule of St. Benedict, which orders the day around prayer, reading and manual work, warns that idleness is the enemy of the soul.[5] The monastic tradition had understood long before the modern economists that liberation from toil is a danger and an opportunity at once.

We may therefore distinguish three possible outcomes of any technical liberation. The freed time may be consumed by distraction. It may be recaptured by intensified production, so that the machine raises the target and the worker is no freer than before. Or it may be given to what Arendt called action and Pieper called leisure: learning, friendship, worship, the care of others, the creative work through which a person becomes someone. The instrument is indifferent among these outcomes. Education, law, culture and personal decision determine which one occurs. Freedom from a burden is a technical achievement. Freedom for something worth doing is a moral and spiritual achievement, and it has to be accomplished again by each generation and each person.

The phrase “becoming more human” invites misunderstanding, and it must be defined with care. Every human being possesses the full dignity of the person from conception to natural death. The infant, the person with severe disability, the dying and the unemployed are not less human than the scholar or the engineer. Dignity is given and cannot be earned or forfeited. What can grow, or fail to grow, is the exercise of what that dignity makes possible: understanding, freedom, responsibility, the capacity to love and the capacity to receive. Becoming more ourselves names this growth in actuality of a humanity already possessed in principle.

The Second Vatican Council gives the measure when it says that a person is more precious for what he is than for what he has, and that the progress of the human person lies in being more, not in having more.[6] Four criteria follow. To become more ourselves is to become more truthful, because freedom without truth degenerates into caprice. It is to become more free, in the sense of mastery over one’s own acts and no longer being driven by appetite, fear or the opinion of others. It is to become more responsible, willing to answer for what one has done and left undone. And it is to become more capable of love, because the Council teaches that the person cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.[7]Self-expression, self-improvement and self-optimisation belong at best to the preparation. They are not the goal.

Part II: The Instruments and the Efforts They Demanded

Writing is the first great externalisation of a mental power. Speech passes; the written word remains and can be recalled, compared and questioned. Memory, which in oral cultures bears the whole weight of tradition, is relieved of part of its burden, and a new kind of thought becomes possible: sustained argument, systematic doctrine, law, history, the revisiting of one’s own earlier words.

Plato’s Socrates saw both sides at once. In the Phaedrus he recounts the myth in which the god Theuth offers writing to King Thamus as a remedy for memory and wisdom, and the king replies that it will produce forgetfulness, giving students the appearance of wisdom without the reality.[8] The warning is not an argument against writing. It names the educational duty that writing creates: to ensure that the text becomes understanding in the one who reads. Walter Ong has argued that literacy reorganised consciousness itself, intensifying the capacity for reflective, analytic and interior thought, even as it altered our relation to memory and presence.[9]

The new effort is reading with understanding. Augustine records his astonishment at watching Ambrose read in silence, his eyes travelling over the page while his voice and tongue were still.[10] The detail is small and decisive. A person who reads silently holds a conversation with a text inside himself. The interior scene has acquired a new room. Silent reading, the examination of conscience and the meditation of Scripture belong to a single development: the self learning to attend to what is addressed to it from beyond itself.

Throughout the early Middle Ages, communities found ways to draw more work from animals and from running water and wind. Historians continue to debate the chronology and weight of particular innovations, among them the horse collar and the harness, the heavy plough and the diffusion of the water mill, and no single device carries the explanation.[11]What is reasonably clear is that the watermill spread widely, and that Marc Bloch’s early insistence on its importance for medieval economic life has endured, even as Lynn White’s more sweeping claims about harnessing and social change have been vigorously contested.[12] The cumulative effect was an enlarged margin of surplus and a lessened dependence on human muscle for tasks such as grinding.

A mill does not automatically give a peasant leisure. A lord may take the benefit through dues, and the surplus may go to the powerful. Yet the possibility was real, and one institution seized it with remarkable deliberation. The monastery used its mills, its ordered agriculture and its discipline of time to protect hours for the opus Dei, for lectio divina and for the work of the hands taken as asceticism rather than drudgery.[13] Whatever the exact technical balance, monasticism offers an early and coherent answer to the question this article poses. Lifted burdens are to be turned into prayer, study and the care of the soul, and manual labour is to be retained precisely for what it forms in the person. The new effort of this age is the ordering of time. A people with more resources than the day demands must decide what the day is for.

The movable-type press of fifteenth-century Europe, of which the Gutenberg Bible of about 1455 is the emblem, built on earlier printing traditions in Asia and transformed the economy of the book.[14] Texts that had required a scribe’s labour for each copy could be multiplied. Elizabeth Eisenstein argued that print altered the conditions of knowledge itself, stabilising texts, enabling comparison and accelerating the circulation of ideas, though her thesis has been criticised for overstating uniformity and has been refined by historians of reading and of the book trade.[15]

The relief was from the labour of copying manuscripts and dependence on scarce and costly texts. The most extraordinary breakthrough concerned the Bible itself. Gutenberg’s Bible, completed around 1455, was the first major book printed in Western Europe using movable metal type. Until then, obtaining an entire Bible was an immense undertaking. It had to be copied laboriously by hand, often by monks in monasteries or by professional scribes, requiring considerable time, skill and expense. A complete Bible was therefore a precious possession, generally beyond the financial reach of ordinary people. With the invention of printing, something unprecedented in European history began to happen: the Word of God could be reproduced in large numbers and progressively made available to an ever-wider public. Although the earliest printed Bibles remained expensive, the possibility of multiplying copies transformed access to Scripture and, ultimately, the relationship between the individual believer and the biblical text.

One can hardly imagine the astonishingly rapid spread of the Protestant Reformation without this technological revolution. Luther’s principle of sola scriptura, which affirmed Scripture as the supreme authority in matters of Christian faith and doctrine, found in printing an extraordinarily powerful means of dissemination. The translation and multiplication of the Bible in vernacular languages, together with the widespread circulation of sermons, pamphlets and theological writings, made possible a religious movement whose speed and geographical expansion would have been unimaginable in the age of handwritten manuscripts. Printing thus became not merely an instrument of communication but a decisive factor in the transformation of religious authority, allowing increasing numbers of Christians to encounter the biblical text and engage directly with questions of doctrine and interpretation.

The new effort was personal appropriation. When books circulate, no authority can read on a person’s behalf. The humanists returned to the sources, among them the Scriptures and the Greek and Latin Fathers, and the reader had to judge between editions, interpretations and claims.[16] In the devotional life the effect was equally significant. Methods of prayer could be put into the hands of laypeople. The Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, the writings of Teresa of Avila on the interior castle of the soul and the whole literature of meditation presuppose a reader capable of working through a text in solitude and in conscience.[17] Print did not create interior life, but it democratised the instruments of its cultivation.

It also created a new danger. A world flooded with books is a world in which anyone may seem to have read everything and understood nothing. Judgement, which cannot be printed, becomes the scarce resource. The same distinction returns in our own day: making a source available and forming someone capable of reading it are different achievements.

Steam power gave humanity a source of energy that did not tire and, unlike water or wind, was not tied to a particular river or season, provided that fuel and infrastructure were available.[18] Electricity then carried power and light into factories and homes, reorganised industrial machinery through the electric motor and brought mechanical assistance into the domestic sphere.[19] The relief from muscular limits and from the tyranny of daylight was enormous. So too was its abuse.

The factory showed that increased capacity is not liberation. Hours lengthened, children worked, bodies were broken and the gains of production were distributed with brutal inequality. Marx’s analysis of estranged labour, in which the worker is alienated from the product, from the act of working, from other persons and from his own species-being, is a secular reading of a real wound.[20] The Church’s response came with Rerum novarum in 1891 and developed through the social teaching that culminated in John Paul II’s Laborem exercens, which affirms the priority of the worker as a person over the process of production and over capital.[21]

The new effort here was social and institutional. Societies able to produce more with less strain had to decide how to share the gains, how to protect rest, how to educate workers and how to dignify work. The invitation to become more ourselves was addressed to institutions as well as individuals, and the interior dimension appeared in a new form: the demand that work be a personal act and not a mere input.

Computing mechanised calculation. Babbage’s engines, never completed as full-scale machines in his lifetime, aimed to eliminate the errors of hand-calculated tables, and electronic computers later performed operations at a scale beyond any unaided mind.[22] The Internet emerged during the 1960s from pioneering research in computer networking, particularly the American ARPANET project, initially funded by the US Department of Defense. Building upon this infrastructure, the British computer scientist Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web at CERN in 1989, introducing a system of interconnected documents accessible through hyperlinks. Its subsequent worldwide expansion, particularly after CERN made the technology freely available in 1993, progressively liberated access to information from geographical and institutional constraints.[23]

The relief was of laborious calculation and of distance. The new effort has two parts. The first is interpretation: a correct computation can answer a badly framed question, and no machine can tell us which questions deserve to be asked. The second is the government of attention. When information is abundant, attention is the scarce good, and what we attend to forms us. A person who cannot choose what deserves sustained presence is governed by whatever claims him most loudly. The ability to reach anyone instantly forces the question of whether we are truly listening to the one before us. Attention, which the contemplative traditions have always regarded as the beginning of prayer, becomes an ethical and spiritual issue for everyone.

The pattern across these stages can be summarised.

StageBurden relievedNew interior effort
WritingTotal reliance on memoryReading with understanding; reflective thought
Animal power, water and windPart of the weight of muscleOrdering of time; deciding what freed time is for
PrintingCopying; dependence on scarce manuscriptsPersonal appropriation; judgement of sources
Steam and electricityMuscular limits; limits of daylightJust organisation of work; protected rest; the worker as person
Computing and the networkLaborious calculation; distanceInterpretation; the government of attention
Artificial intelligenceMuch routine intellectual labourDistinguishing act from output; owning judgement; receiving a vocation

At each stage the instrument assumed a burden, and the person was not diminished but displaced upward and inward: from muscle to judgement, from copying to understanding, from calculation to interpretation, from information to attention. The movement is inward as well as upward. Each stage requires more of what cannot be delegated: attention, judgement, responsibility and the personal appropriation of truth. This is the technical history in outline. The next part turns to the history that accompanied it.

Part III: The Inward Turn

The interior life did not begin with modernity. Augustine, writing at the end of the fourth century, made the soul’s depth the central theme of the Confessions. He found God interior intimo meo, more inward than his own inmost self, and confessed the long folly of seeking outside what was within: “You were within me, and I was outside.”[24] His counsel in another work condenses the programme: do not go outside, return into yourself, for truth dwells in the inner man.[25]Charles Taylor, in his history of the modern identity, begins precisely here, with the Augustinian turn inward as a way to God, before tracing its reorientation in Descartes and in the modern period.[26]

The fourteenth century sharpened the question of the individual. William of Ockham, in giving priority to the existence of individual things and denying that universals are real entities outside the mind, drew attention to the irreducible concreteness of what exists.[27] We must not turn this into a slogan, as though Ockham invented personal freedom or reduced concepts to arbitrary names. His own position is subtler, and the genealogical lines from medieval nominalism to modern individualism are contested. What can be said is that Ockham sharpened the problem every adequate anthropology must face: the individual is never exhausted by a general description, yet a common humanity binds individuals together.

The sixteenth century intensified the accent on personal conscience before God. The Reformers insisted that no one can believe, repent or answer to God in another’s place. Luther’s Freedom of a Christian holds together two propositions, that the Christian is lord of all and subject to none, and that he is servant of all and subject to every one, so that personal faith is joined to service of the neighbour.[28] Reformation churches also built communal worship, catechism and discipline, so the stereotype of Protestant solipsism requires correction. For Catholics, the permanent gain of this moment is the insistence that faith must be personally appropriated, and the permanent hazard is the notion that private judgement is sufficient for all questions.

Montaigne turned the interior gaze on himself in the Essais, declaring that he was himself the matter of his book.[29]Descartes, in the Meditations, founded certainty on the thinking subject: I think, therefore I am.[30] The cogito gave the first-person standpoint a decisive place in philosophy and taught a discipline of examining one’s assumptions. It also risked a disembodied and isolated subject, a thinker prior to body, world and other persons. Pascal answered from within the same century. The heart has reasons that reason does not know, and the person is more than the calculating intellect.[31]

Kant defined Enlightenment as the human being’s emergence from self-incurred immaturity, a failure not of understanding but of resolution and courage to use it without another’s guidance.[32] The definition identifies a duty that assistance, including technical assistance, must serve and must not supplant. For Kant the moral person is an end and never merely a means, a principle that supplies one of the most serious criteria for judging any system, human or mechanical, that values persons chiefly for their usefulness.[33] His autonomy is the self-legislation of reason under a universal law and does not mean that whatever an individual chooses becomes right. From a Christian standpoint it needs completion by an account of creaturehood, received truth and grace. Yet it fixes a requirement that remains valid: the person must become an agent capable of responsible judgement.

Kierkegaard pressed the interior question to a point at which the philosophical subject is displaced by the existing individual standing alone before God. Against the dissolution of the person into the crowd, the system or the public, he insisted on the single individual. Yet his most precise formula refuses self-enclosure. The self, he writes, is a relation that relates itself to itself, and in willing to be itself it rests transparently in the power that established it.[34] That sentence contains in miniature the whole argument of this article. The deepest self-possession is a transparent dependence. The person who looks inward far enough finds that he did not make himself.

Tocqueville coined a sense of the word individualism to describe a calm and considered feeling that disposes each citizen to withdraw into the circle of family and friends, leaving society at large to itself.[35] He distinguished it from selfishness, which is a passion, and noted that it flourishes when the bonds of inherited social order loosen. The observation is exact. Individualism is the interior turn deprived of its horizon. It treats the self as a given to be expressed, protected and optimised, and not as a gift to be received and a task to be accomplished. It is autonomy detached from truth and from the neighbour.

Liberation from burdens makes the temptation stronger. When instruments do more, the pressures that once forced cooperation weaken. The neighbour who was needed to haul, grind or copy is needed less. Technical liberation thus supplies the material conditions for individualism, and the interior discoveries of the modern age offer it the vocabulary. The result is a person who has never been so free and who has seldom been so lonely. Individualism does not deepen the self; it flattens it, because the self is constituted by relations that it denies.

Freud’s achievement belongs to this history because it forced upon the modern subject a humiliation that was also a discovery. Psychoanalysis, he wrote, delivers the third great blow to human self-love by showing that the ego is not master in its own house.[36] The sovereign subject of Descartes and Kant is shown to be driven by desires, memories and defences of which it is largely unaware. The interior is now a territory with a hidden depth, and the effort required is a new kind of self-examination that is patient, suspicious of its own motives and aware of its own divisions.

The gains are substantial. The psychological disciplines taught us to recognise habit, emotion, trauma and the conditions that limit freedom. William James’s Principles of Psychology explored attention, habit and the structure of the self as known and as knower.[37] Clinical practice has healed real suffering and restored real capacities. A sound spiritual formation will use them. Yet psychology plurals the account of the self. Competing schools give competing pictures, and each is partial. A description of how a person functions cannot decide whether the person is responsible, what he owes to others or what he is for.

Viktor Frankl, who survived the camps and developed logotherapy in their aftermath, supplies the necessary correction from within psychology itself. He argued that the primary human drive is not pleasure, as in Freud, nor power, but the will to meaning, and that a person who loses a why to live for cannot be restored by technique alone.[38] The clinic thus points beyond the clinic. Psychology, taken honestly, hands the person back to the questions of meaning, responsibility and relation that it cannot itself resolve.

The twentieth century produced the most consequential philosophical correction of individualism: personalism. Emmanuel Mounier, writing in the crisis of the 1930s, rejected both liberal individualism and collectivism, arguing that the person exists only in going out toward others and is therefore neither an atom nor a cog.[39] Jacques Maritain drew the decisive distinction between individuality and personality. Individuality, he argued, is rooted in matter and makes each of us a fragment of the species and of the universe; personality is rooted in spirit and makes each of us a whole, a subject capable of knowing and loving, and so ordered to the common good as well as to God above any political community.[40]Martin Buber’s I and Thou located the person in the relation of address and response, distinguishing it from the relation to objects.[41] Edith Stein investigated empathy as the way in which another’s inner life is given to me.[42] Karol Wojtyła, in Person and Act, argued that the person reveals himself in action, in the acts in which he determines himself, and in Love and Responsibility that the person is a good to which the only adequate response is love.[43]

The theological tradition had prepared the concept. Boethius defined the person as an individual substance of a rational nature.[44] Richard of Saint Victor, reflecting on the Trinity, emphasised the incommunicable existence of the person.[45]Joseph Ratzinger showed that the concept of person arose from the Christological and Trinitarian controversies, and that in this context the person is understood as relation: the Father is defined by the Son, and the Son by the Father.[46] John Zizioulas drew from the Greek Fathers the thesis that personhood is constituted in communion and is therefore not reducible to individuality.[47] The Council summarises: man is the only creature on earth that God willed for its own sake.[48]

Personalism’s achievement is to hold together what individualism and collectivism separate. The person is irreducibly unique and irreducibly relational, inviolable in dignity and fulfilled only in gift. This is the exact form the interior turn takes when it reaches its goal. The next part examines why the surrounding disciplines, in different ways, helped to bring it there.

Part IV: Purification

Paul Ricoeur named Marx, Nietzsche and Freud the masters of suspicion, because each taught the modern mind to distrust the apparent meaning of consciousness, religion and morality as a mask of economic interest, resentment or wish.[49] The paradox is that Ricoeur also saw in this critique a purification of faith: the atheism of the critics can destroy the idol that faith ought to have destroyed already, the God of projection, consolation and social control.[50] Freud’s Future of an Illusion presented religion as the fulfilment of the oldest wishes of humanity.[51] A faith that is only the projection of the wish for a protecting father deserves the critique, and nothing in the Gospel requires us to defend it. The critique therefore compels us to ask what Christianity is when it is not consolation, moral support or the sacralisation of the group.

Exegesis worked the same effect on a different front. The nineteenth-century quest for the historical Jesus produced a succession of portraits of a teacher of the noble ideals of each author’s age. Albert Schweitzer’s survey closed that quest by showing that the Jesus it had constructed was a mirror: the scholars had looked into the well of history and seen their own faces, and the actual historical figure was strange, eschatological and disconcerting.[52] Rudolf Bultmann’s programme of demythologisation, whatever its failings, insisted that the New Testament proclamation demands a decision and cannot be treated as a collection of timeless ideas.[53] The Catholic response, articulated in Dei Verbum, welcomed the study of literary forms and historical context while insisting that Scripture be read in the same Spirit in which it was written, attentive to the unity of the whole, the living Tradition of the Church and the analogy of faith.[54] Benedict XVI’s Jesus of Nazareth attempted to hold the historical and the theological readings together.[55]

What exegesis stripped away was a generic Jesus: a moral teacher, a social reformer, a symbol of human potential. What it uncovered, against the intention of many of its practitioners, was the particular claim: a man who speaks of the Kingdom as arriving in his own person, forgives sins, calls disciples to follow him and was crucified and proclaimed risen. The more rigorous the historical work, the harder it becomes to extract from the Gospels a Christianity that does not depend on this claim. A purely ethical Christianity is not what the texts present.

The same pattern appears wherever the human sciences have taken Christianity seriously. Psychology removes the self-projected God and drives us to ask who actually speaks. Exegesis removes the generic teacher and drives us to ask who actually comes. Philosophy removes the isolated subject and drives us to ask who actually calls. In each case what falls away is a surrogate, and what remains is the particular and unsubstitutable: a Person who addresses persons. This is what is specifically Christian. It is not an ethic, a spirituality of interiority or a therapeutic technique, all of which have their analogues elsewhere. It is the claim that God has spoken and acted in history, in Jesus Christ, and that the human vocation is a response to him.

A third test of the interior turn is ideology. The twentieth century gave us the militant who accepts prison, torture or death rather than betray his comrades or his cause, and many such people were sincere, courageous and selfless to a degree that puts the comfortable to shame. How should a Christian regard them? The question is not rhetorical, and it requires neither contempt nor confusion.

First, honour what is genuine. Courage, fidelity and willingness to give one’s life for others are real goods, and the Church has never taught that they are absent outside her visible boundaries. Justin Martyr spoke of seeds of the Word scattered among the nations.[56] The Council teaches that those who through no fault of their own do not know the Gospel but sincerely seek God and strive under grace to do his will can attain salvation, and that the Holy Spirit offers to all the possibility of being associated, in a way known to God, with the paschal mystery.[57] No Christian is entitled to pass sentence on the interior destiny of any idealist. The Church’s judgement concerns martyrdom in the proper sense, which it examines in the causes of canonisation, and it makes no pronouncement on the eternal fate of anyone else.

Second, distinguish. The martyr is a witness, which is what the Greek word means. Aquinas treats martyrdom as an act of fortitude in which a person endures death for the sake of the faith of Christ and divine truth.[58] The martyr does not seek death, kills no one and does not surrender his conscience to a collective. He is put to death in hatred of the faith, and he goes to it free. Ignatius of Antioch, on his way to Rome, writes that he is God’s wheat, to be ground by the teeth of beasts.[59] Stephen prays for his killers.[60] Everything is directed to a Person who has first loved him.

The idealist differs from the martyr in at least five respects, and the differences do not belittle the idealist’s courage but mark what that courage serves.

First, the object. The martyr gives himself to a Person, Christ, who is alive and who calls. The idealist gives himself to an idea, a movement or a future society. An idea can claim a life but cannot receive it, return it, forgive or call by name.

Second, the status of persons. An ideology that places history, the nation or the class above the person will sacrifice persons to the cause. Arendt showed that totalitarian ideologies reduce human beings to superfluity, mere functions of an alleged law of history.[61] Koestler’s Darkness at Noon dramatises the logic: the old Bolshevik who has justified the sacrifice of others to the revolution finds himself justly sacrificed by the same reasoning.[62] The martyr gives his own life and takes none. The ideologue, even when he gives his own, has usually spent the lives of others first. Kant’s principle that humanity is always an end and never merely a means condemns this logic at its root.

Third, the means. The Christian martyr’s weapon is love of the enemy. The ideologue’s weapon is struggle. Solzhenitsyn, who had been a convinced Marxist before the Gulag, recorded the discovery that the line dividing good from evil runs through the heart of every human being and not between classes or parties.[63] The martyr and the idealist may suffer alike, but they are not alike in what they do to others.

Fourth, truth. Sincerity establishes the character of the one who dies, and it does not establish the truth of what he dies for. A person may die with perfect sincerity for a falsehood. The martyr’s witness is credible, not because of the intensity of his conviction, but because the fact to which he testifies, the death and resurrection of Christ, is a fact of history that does not depend on his conviction.

Fifth, hope. The idealist hopes in the verdict of history, in a future generation that will justify the sacrifice. The martyr hopes in the resurrection of the dead, in a God who justifies the sacrificed here and now. Saint Paul gives the decisive criterion: if I deliver my body to be burned but have not love, I gain nothing.[64] The supreme act of self-gift, divorced from love, is empty. Martyrdom is the supreme witness of love because it is its completion, as the Council teaches.[65]

The communist who gives his life is nevertheless an instructive figure. His sacrifice shows that the thirst for self-gift is natural to the human heart, that it is not manufactured by the Church and that it will seek an object. Ideology, from this perspective, is a counterfeit vocation: it harvests the person’s hunger to give himself and spends it on a cause that cannot receive the gift. The Council, in discussing atheism, observes that one form of it expects the liberation of man chiefly from economic and social emancipation and holds that religion, by pointing hope to a future life, hinders it.[66] The Christian reply is not that this hunger is mistaken, but that it has found a creature where it needed a Person. The failure of the ideologies of the twentieth century, written in the lives of those who gave everything to them, confirms the point by experience.

Part V: Consequences

Philosophy cannot supply the faith, but it can establish a good deal about the shape of the question, and the history traced above has made it more precise.

It can establish that the person is not a function. A function is defined by what it produces; a person is the subject who acts and who answers for the acts. This explains why productivity cannot ground an anthropology. If persons were valued for output, the infant, the elderly and the disabled would have no claim, and anyone replaceable by a machine would become redundant as a person. Dignity precedes performance.

It can establish that the person is not the sovereign subject of early modernity. The body, language, the unconscious, history and other persons all participate in the constitution of the self. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perception showed that consciousness is bodily through and through, and that we do not have a body so much as we are one.[67] The AI debates sometimes assume that intelligence is an abstract operation on information. Philosophers have long questioned this. John Searle’s Chinese room argument held that the manipulation of symbols according to rules does not suffice for understanding, an argument disputed but never dismissed.[68] We need not settle what machines may one day do in order to see that human understanding is embodied, situated and attached to a life.

It can establish that certain acts are non-transferable. Arendt analysed promising and forgiving as the faculties by which action in the world is made bearable, and both are personal in an exact sense: no one can forgive on my behalf or keep my promise.[69] An assistant may help me find the words of an apology, and the apology remains mine. The act is the person’s, not the output’s. This distinction between act and output is the philosophical key to the age of AI. An output can be reproduced by any competent producer. An act is the act of someone, once, in a life.

It can establish that the person is relational, and that uniqueness and communion are not rivals. The person becomes himself in the encounter with another, in address and response, and not in isolation.

Philosophy’s limit is also instructive. It can describe the form of the person, but not supply the content of a vocation. It shows the openness of the question and does not close it.

Theology begins where philosophy stops. It says that the person is not only open to an answer but already addressed. The prophet records God’s word: I have called you by name, you are mine.[70] The Apocalypse promises the victor a white stone on which a new name is written, known only to the one who receives it.[71] Uniqueness in the Christian understanding is not primarily an achievement or a personality profile. It is a name given by another. The person is unique because he is called, and he is called individually because he is loved.

Theology therefore changes the meaning of the question that AI raises. The question is not what a human being can do that a machine cannot, which would make our dignity hostage to the next technical advance. The question is what a human being is called to, and this has nothing to do with a competition. The Council teaches that Christ, the new Adam, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear.[72] The human vocation is therefore not a task we invent but a person we answer. In Christ, the Son who gives himself entirely to the Father in the Spirit, the human being discovers that his own fulfilment lies in the same movement: to receive himself as gift and give himself in love.

This yields several specific theological claims.

First, self-possession serves self-gift. We must come to know ourselves, our gifts and our wounds, in order to be able to give ourselves. The long labour of interiorisation, with the help of psychology and philosophy where they are sound, is a preparation for love, not an end in itself.

Second, grace is not produced. A person can be taught about prayer, helped by techniques and accompanied by a director, but the encounter with God is a gift. No instrument can generate the consent of faith or replace the action of grace within the soul. The contemplative traditions, from the Desert Fathers to the Carmelites, insist that what we do is dispose ourselves, and what God does is give himself.

Third, work is a participation in creation. The book of Genesis places the human being in the garden to till and keep it. John Paul II develops the point: work has a subjective dimension, in which the worker is a person who realises himself through his labour, that outweighs its objective product.[73] Technology, rightly directed, extends this participation. It becomes a distortion when it is used to treat the person as an input.

Fourth, the body belongs to the vocation. The Incarnation, the sacraments and the resurrection of the body testify that the human being is not a mind in a machine. Formation must therefore include bodily practice, presence and community, and the Church’s liturgy remains the model of embodied, communal, receptive action.

Fifth, the Christian claim is specific. It would be easy to dissolve all that has been said into a generic humanism of depth and self-realisation. The thread of the argument forbids this. Psychology can heal a wound but cannot forgive a sin. Exegesis can establish the claim but cannot give the faith that receives it. Philosophy can show the person’s openness but cannot fill it. Only revelation says that God became man, that the Word was made flesh, that the crucified is risen and that in him the human vocation is revealed and fulfilled. The history of the self, with all its detours, converges on this answer, and the human sciences have helped to clear away what obscured it.

Artificial intelligence now performs tasks we had thought distinctive of the human mind. It writes, translates, summarises, proposes, calculates and converses. Each earlier technology relieved the body or a particular mental labour. This one relieves a broad range of the activities by which we have identified ourselves: our competence. If a person is what he can do, the machine is a rival. If a person is someone who is called, the machine is an instrument, and a powerful one.

The Dicasteries for the Doctrine of the Faith and for Culture and Education address the matter in Antiqua et nova, which states that AI should not be seen as an artificial form of human intelligence but as a product of it.[74] Human intelligence, in this understanding, is embodied, relational and ordered to truth and to the good, and cannot be reduced to the performance of tasks. The note does not claim to settle every question about future machines. It states a criterion: a technology is judged by how it serves the integral development of persons and their communion.

Pope Leo XIV develops this discernment further in his encyclical Magnifica Humanitas (2026). He welcomes the capacity of technology to relieve human beings of arduous, repetitive and burdensome tasks, while warning that technological progress does not automatically constitute human progress. When efficiency becomes the ultimate criterion of value, the human person risks becoming an object of optimisation rather than a subject called to freedom, responsibility and communion. The liberation offered by artificial intelligence is therefore profoundly ambivalent. By relieving us of certain intellectual burdens, it can create opportunities for deeper reflection, creativity, study, human relationships and prayer. Yet the same technology can foster passivity, dependence, diminished intellectual effort and the gradual weakening of personal judgement. The decisive question is therefore not simply what technology liberates us from, but what it liberates us for. The freedom gained through technological advancement must be deliberately appropriated and directed towards the fuller development of the human person. Otherwise, what appeared to be liberation may become a new form of servitude. Technological emancipation, in other words, is not yet human maturation: the latter requires the conscious exercise of freedom, the cultivation of our faculties and the responsible pursuit of what is truly good.[75]

We may therefore name the new effort of this age. It consists of four demands.

The first is to distinguish output from act. A system can supply the text of an apology, a prayer, a sermon or a decision, but only a person can apologise, pray, preach or decide. The risk is not that machines will do these things in our place but that we will allow the outward form to stand in for the act, and so cease to perform the act at all.

The second is to keep formative difficulty. Learning a language, working through a proof, writing a hard paragraph and sitting with a text until it yields are not inefficiencies to be eliminated. They are the means by which the capacities we hope to exercise are formed. If assistance removes every difficulty, the student looks accomplished and remains unable to explain or defend what he has handed in. The effort that machines make unnecessary is often the effort that makes us who we are, and it must be chosen deliberately.

The third is to own judgement. The user must still examine, test, weigh and decide. Kant’s question applies with new force: will we leave to the machine the guardianship from which Enlightenment was supposed to free us? A system’s fluency is not truth, and the more persuasive the answer, the more necessary the discipline of judgement.

The fourth is to receive our vocation. If our worth was never in our output, then the loss of the monopoly on output frees us to ask what we were made for. The invitation is spiritual before it is economic, though it is economic too: those displaced from work have a claim to retraining, fair conditions and access to meaningful occupation, and a spiritual reading that ignores their material situation is not credible.

In this sense AI completes the stripping that began with psychology, exegesis and the failure of ideology. Psychology removed the sovereign ego, exegesis removed the generic Jesus, ideology’s collapse removed the secular salvation, and AI removes the identification of the person with competence. What remains is the person who is called and who answers. That is not a lesser thing. It is the original thing.

Part VI: Practical Consequences

The conclusions of this study are practical. They can be stated as commitments, each of which can begin in an ordinary week.

Discern what is delegable. For each task, ask whether it requires me as the one who acts. Drafting a schedule, tidying data or summarising a document may be delegated without loss. Consoling a friend, deciding a case of conscience, forgiving, praying and teaching a student to think are acts in which my presence is the substance. Delegate the first kind freely. Protect the second kind jealously.

Protect formative difficulty. Choose to read a sustained argument without a summary, to learn a language without a translator, to write a first draft yourself, to work with your hands. Educators should design assessments that reveal understanding through dialogue, application and defence, and not only through the production of text.

Search for the specific vocation. Each person is called by name. The question is therefore not what is useful to do but what I am called to do, with these gifts and in this place. This is a matter of discernment, not of self-invention. It is best undertaken in prayer, in the light of Scripture, with an honest account of one’s gifts, wounds and circumstances, and with the help of a spiritual director.

Practise interiority in its Christian form. Silence, lectio divina, the prayer of the heart and the Ignatian examination train the interior attention that technology scatters. They differ from relaxation techniques because they address Someone. The effort of interiorisation that the modern age has taught us finds in them its proper object.

Test your commitments. Whatever cause claims your devotion, ask whom it treats as a means, whom it permits you to hate, what it demands of your conscience and what it hopes in. The test distinguishes witness from ideology. It applies equally to political causes, to professional ambitions and to ecclesial enthusiasms.

Rebuild communion. Technical liberation tempts us toward isolation. Choose concrete bonds: a family table, a parish, a friend who is allowed to disagree. The person is found in relation, and relation requires bodily presence and time.

Reorganise institutions around persons. Employers should share the gains of productivity, protect rest and offer retraining. Schools should form judgement. Churches should offer formation that connects technical competence with moral discernment and prayer.

For those who form others. Teachers, directors and formators should shift their emphasis from the transmission of information, which machines can now do, to the formation of persons: of judgement, of habits, of prayer and of the capacity to receive. Spiritual direction, long regarded as a specialised ministry, becomes more important as outward production becomes easier, because it is the practice most directly concerned with the personal response to God’s call. Communities should be able to say to the young: whatever the machine can do, you have a name and a mission that no one else can accomplish.

Conclusion

The history of technology is a history of liberations, and each liberation poses the same question in a new form. The animal and the mill relieved the body and left time for the ordering of the day. Writing and print relieved memory and copying and summoned the reader to understanding and to conscience. Steam and electricity relieved muscle and darkness and demanded a just organisation of work. Computing and the network relieved calculation and distance and demanded interpretation and attention. Artificial intelligence relieves a broad share of our intellectual labour and demands that we say what, if anything, was ever essentially ours.

Alongside this history, a second history unfolded: the discovery of interiority, conscience, the subject, the psyche and the person. It had its false turns, among them individualism, psychological self-management and the ideologies that spent the human capacity for self-gift on causes that could not receive it. Yet through these detours, the human sciences have performed a service to faith, perhaps unintentionally. Psychology has compelled us to distinguish faith from wish, exegesis to distinguish the Christ of the Gospels from our projections, the failure of ideologies to distinguish the martyr from the militant, and technology itself to distinguish the person from the producer. The surrogates have fallen away one by one.

What remains is the person, called by name, made for communion and fulfilled in the gift of self. This is not an invention of the modern age, but the modern age has made it unavoidable. The more our instruments accomplish, the less we can hide behind our accomplishments, and the more we are brought back to the question that no instrument can answer for us: who are you, and to whom do you belong? The Christian answer is that we belong to the God who has called us by name, and that we become ourselves in the measure that we answer. Yet this answer is not merely intellectual or moral. It opens onto the greatest undertaking of human existence: the spiritual journey towards union with God and the fullness of Love. This is the journey so magnificently described by St Teresa of Avila in her Interior Castle and by St John of the Cross in his Spiritual Canticle: a progressive transformation of the whole person, through purification and the action of divine grace, culminating in the union of love with God. No artificial intelligence, however advanced, can undertake this journey in our place, consent to grace on our behalf or love God for us. Throughout history, technological revolutions have progressively relieved humanity of burdensome tasks, inviting us to rise towards activities that are more properly human. Artificial intelligence brings this movement to an unprecedented level. By taking over an increasing number of our intellectual and practical tasks, it may free us to devote ourselves more fully to what constitutes our deepest vocation. The challenge, therefore, is not to compete with the machine, nor to flee it, but to rise higher, towards what only the human person, freely cooperating with divine grace, can accomplish. Ultimately, we are not called merely to do more, to know more or to produce more, but to become more fully what we were created to be: persons capable of receiving and giving the fullness of Love. The greatest achievement of human existence is not something we can manufacture, delegate or automate. It is to allow God to bring us to the fullness of union with Him, where, as St John of the Cross teaches in the Spiritual Canticle, love becomes the soul’s very occupation.

Read also:

Between Two Worlds: The Anxiety of the Unknown, the Wisdom of the Centuries and a Vocation for the Generation of Artificial Intelligence

The City of God, Understanding Time and History

The Future is Jesus

Mary, the Prophecy

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[1]Aristotle, Politics I.4, 1253b–1254a, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Internet Classics Archive, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). The passage occurs within an argument defending slavery, which this article rejects. It is cited for the possibility it describes of self-operating instruments and its implications for the arrangements previously regarded as necessary.

[2]Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), Prologue. Arendt’s distinctions among labour, work and action are developed in chapters III to V.

[3]John Maynard Keynes, “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” (1930), in Essays in Persuasion (London: Macmillan, 1931). Keynes’s optimistic prediction about working hours has not been borne out; his formulation of the problem remains pertinent.

[4]Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture, trans. Alexander Dru (London: Faber and Faber, 1952).

[5]The Rule of Saint Benedict, chapter 48, in RB 1980: The Rule of St. Benedict in English, ed. Timothy Fry (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1981).

[6]Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et spes (7 December 1965), section 35. The Council distinguishes the growth of the person from the accumulation of possessions and power.

[7]Gaudium et spes, section 24. The Council says that man, who is the only creature on earth that God has willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.

[8]Plato, Phaedrus 274c–277a, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Internet Classics Archive, MIT).

[9]Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 1982). Ong’s thesis has been debated, but his account of the interiorising effects of writing remains influential.

[10]Augustine, Confessions VI.3.3, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[11]Gail Brownrigg, “Medieval Horse Harness: The Evidence of the Images,” in The Horse in Premodern European Culture, ed. Anastasija Ropa and Timothy Dawson (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020). Brownrigg questions explanations centred on a single revolutionary device and stresses the role of traces and of cumulative, regionally uneven change.

[12]Marc Bloch, “Avènement et conquêtes du moulin à eau,” Annales d’histoire économique et sociale 7 (1935): 538–563; Lynn White Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). White’s claims about the stirrup, the plough and the horse collar have been extensively criticised.

[13]Jean Gimpel, The Medieval Machine: The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976). The book is a popular synthesis, and its more general claims about a medieval industrial revolution are disputed; the monastic use of water power is, however, well attested.

[14]Library of Congress, “The Gutenberg Bible,” Bible Collection exhibition. The sources locate Gutenberg’s Bible in the mid-fifteenth century and do not make him the inventor of printing worldwide.

[15]Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Her thesis was criticised, notably by Adrian Johns in The Nature of the Book (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), for overstating the fixity of printed texts.

[16]Library of Congress, “Humanism,” in Rome Reborn: The Vatican Library and Renaissance Culture, which documents the humanists’ interest in Greek patristic as well as classical sources.

[17]Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises; Teresa of Avila, The Interior Castle. These works are cited as examples of devotional methods designed for personal appropriation, not as products of print alone.

[18]Science Museum, “In Pursuit of Power” (2012). For the uneven diffusion of steam power, see the research reassessment in The Economic History Review, “Stationary Steam Power in the United Kingdom, 1800–70: An Empirical Reassessment,” https://doi.org/10.1111/ehr.13375.

[19]Smithsonian National Museum of American History, “Lighting a Revolution,” especially “19th Century Consequences.” The museum does not claim that appliances automatically reduced total household labour; the interpretation of released time is the author’s.

[20]Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, first manuscript, “Estranged Labour.”

[21]Leo XIII, Rerum novarum (15 May 1891); John Paul II, Laborem exercens (14 September 1981), especially sections 5–7 and 12–15 on the priority of labour over capital and the subjective dimension of work.

[22]Computer History Museum, “A Brief History,” The Babbage Engine; University of Cambridge, Whipple Museum, “Charles Babbage’s Difference Engine.”

[23]CERN, “The Birth of the Web.” The year 1989 marks the invention of the Web at CERN, not the beginning of the internet.

[24]Augustine, Confessions X.27.38, trans. Chadwick; the phrase interior intimo meo is at III.6.11. On self-knowledge and illumination see X.5.7.

[25]Augustine, De vera religione 39.72.

[26]Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), Part II, “Inwardness.”

[27]“William of Ockham,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised 2024; “The Medieval Problem of Universals,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The anthropological reading offered here is interpretive and does not assert a direct causal genealogy of modernity.

[28]Martin Luther, The Freedom of a Christian (1520), the opening paired theses. Historical text and commentary available through Bridwell Library, Southern Methodist University.

[29]Michel de Montaigne, Essais, “Au lecteur.”

[30]René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Meditation II. See also “Self-Consciousness,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[31]Blaise Pascal, Pensées, Lafuma 423 (Brunschvicg 277).

[32]Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” (1784), Academy edition 8:35, in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[33]Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), section II, Academy edition 4:429 on humanity as an end, and 4:440 on autonomy.

[34]Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death (1849), Part I, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

[35]Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, part 2, chapter 2.

[36]Sigmund Freud, “A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis” (1917), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, vol. 17 (London: Hogarth Press, 1955). Freud presents psychoanalysis as the third blow to human narcissism, after Copernicus and Darwin.

[37]William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), vol. 1, especially chapter 10, “The Consciousness of Self.”

[38]Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006; first published in German, 1946). Frankl’s positions remain debated among clinicians; the point here is the critique of reductive accounts.

[39]Emmanuel Mounier, Manifeste au service du personnalisme (Paris: Aubier, 1936); Le Personnalisme (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1949).

[40]Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), chapter 3.

[41]Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937; first published 1923).

[42]Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy (1917), trans. Waltraut Stein (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

[43]Karol Wojtyła, Person and Act, published in English as The Acting Person (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979); Love and Responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993).

[44]Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium 3.

[45]Richard of Saint Victor, De Trinitate IV.

[46]Joseph Ratzinger, “Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology,” Communio 17 (1990): 439–454.

[47]John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985).

[48]Gaudium et spes, section 24.

[49]Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), where the phrase “school of suspicion” is developed.

[50]Paul Ricoeur, “Religion, Atheism, and Faith,” in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974).

[51]Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion (1927), in Standard Edition, vol. 21.

[52]Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. W. Montgomery (London: A. & C. Black, 1910; German original, 1906).

[53]Rudolf Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology” (1941), in Kerygma and Myth, ed. Hans-Werner Bartsch, trans. Reginald H. Fuller (London: SPCK, 1953).

[54]Second Vatican Council, Dei Verbum (18 November 1965), section 12.

[55]Joseph Ratzinger / Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth, vol. 1 (New York: Doubleday, 2007), Foreword.

[56]Justin Martyr, Second Apology 8 and 13.

[57]Second Vatican Council, Lumen gentium (21 November 1964), section 16; Gaudium et spes, section 22.

[58]Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II, q. 124.

[59]Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Romans 4.

[60]Acts 7:59–60.

[61]Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), Part III.

[62]Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (London: Jonathan Cape, 1940).

[63]Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, trans. Thomas P. Whitney, vol. 2 (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), Part IV, chapter 1.

[64]1 Corinthians 13:3.

[65]Lumen gentium, section 42, on martyrdom as the supreme witness of love.

[66]Gaudium et spes, section 20.

[67]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962; French original, 1945).

[68]John R. Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 417–457. The argument has attracted extensive criticism, and the present article does not rest on its success.

[69]Arendt, The Human Condition, chapter V, sections 33–34, on forgiveness and promising.

[70]Isaiah 43:1.

[71]Revelation 2:17.

[72]Gaudium et spes, section 22.

[73]John Paul II, Laborem exercens, sections 5–6, on the objective and subjective dimensions of work.

[74]Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith and Dicastery for Culture and Education, Antiqua et nova: Note on the Relationship Between Artificial Intelligence and Human Intelligence (28 January 2025), especially section 35.

[75]Leo XIV, Encyclical Letter Magnifica Humanitas (15 May 2026), §§100, 112–114, 148–152. Particularly significant is §152, where the Pope welcomes technology’s capacity to relieve people of difficult tasks while insisting upon the protection of human dignity and the irreplaceable role of the person. See also §112 on the danger of reducing human flourishing to efficiency and optimisation.